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Rhetoric and the fate of budgeting 
 
Abstract: 
This  study  focuses  on  the  roles  of  rhetoric  and  of  the  various  actors  in  institutionalisation  and 
deinstitutionalisation  attempts.  Our  paper  jointly  investigates  the  process  whereby  budgeting  became 
institutionalised  between  1930  and  1960  and  the  attempts  of  the  CAM-I  to  deinstitutionalise  it  from  1990. 
Paradoxically, the same two arguments have been used to support the institutionalisation of and the attempts to 
deinstitutionalise budgets. Firstly, in the 1930’s the turbulence of the environment is used a rhetorical argument 
to support the implementation of budgeting. Since 1990, the turbulence of the environment has generated a 
feeling that budgeting should be abandoned. Secondly in  the 1930’s and 1950’s budgets contributed to the 
emancipation of managers, while since 1990 they have been deemed as rigid frameworks preventing managers 
from acting freely. These contradictions reveal that we can not explain such changes by the rhetorical schemes 
alone. The network of actors in which these schemes are embedded has a large part in the influence of rhetoric in 
the change from one institutional order to another. It is particularly the actors to whom these rhetorical schemes 
are  addressed  which  give  them  their  meanings.  Finally,  the  similarities  between  the  rhetoric  used  can  be 
explained if we analyse it as the means to transcend the fluctuating contradictions of institutional logics.  
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Introduction 
Following  Zucker’s  contention  (1991)  that  the  process  of  institutionalisation  had  largely 
remained a “black box”. Since this research Cooper et al. (2008) show that many studies have 
been conducted on this theme. The rhetoric strategies developed by the actors are one of the 
mechanisms of the institutionalisation of managerial concepts or ideas (Phillips et al. 2004, 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005, Maguire & Hardy, 2006, Greenwood et al. 2008). Rhetoric 
strategies are the “speech and writings that subconsciously reflect and deliberately manipulate 
the values and ideologies of a particular discourse community” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005, 
40) Further to the institutionalisation process, certain managerial concepts are thus taken for 
granted. According to Scott (1987) individuals come to accept a shared definition of social 
reality. Discussions on the characteristics of these concepts may thus develop without it being 
necessary to refer to the underlying practices (Phillips et al. 2004).  
Previous  stream  of  research  was  not  however  conducted  in  order  to  understand  the 
deinstitutionalization  process,  that  is  to  say  the  changes  which  allow  a  switch  from  one 
institutional  order  to  another  (Greenwood  et  al.,  2002,  Maguire  &  Hardy,  2009). Is  this 
process symmetrical to the process of institutionalisation? Are the same mechanisms involved? 
What  is  the  role  of  the  actors  and  of  the  rhetoric  developed  by  them  to  destabilise  an 
institution? 
In  response  to  these  questions,  we  propose  to  study  in  parallel  the  rhetoric  used  to 
institutionalise and to attempt to deinstitutionalise the concept of budget. We could expect the 
rhetoric used to destabilise the concept of budget to use different arguments, which may be 
either opposing or symmetrical, to those used to institutionalise it.  
The  budget  is  a  typical  example  of  an  institutionalised  accounting  concept  (Covaleski, 
Dirsmith,  1983,  1988,  Fernandez-Revuelta  &  Robson,  1999,  Berland  &  Boyns,  2002, 
Ezzamel et al. 2007b, Berland & Chiapello, 2009) which is taken for granted. Budgeting as an 
institution  has  however  for  some  years  been  the  subject  of  deinstitutionalising  attempts 
through critical discourse. Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric contends that. 
The budget is the bane of corporate America. It never should have 
existed… Making a budget is an exercise in minimalisation. You’re 
always  getting  the  lowest  out  of  people,  because  everyone  is 
negotiating to get the lowest number (Loeb, 1995: 5).  
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It was in answer to such viewpoints that CAM-I
1 (Hope & Fraser 2003a et b) set up a think 
tank known as the BBRT (Beyond Budgeting Roundtable), in order to “eliminate budgeting”. 
This deinstitutionalisation attempt thus permits the rhetoric used by the BBRT to be compared 
with that used at the time budgeting was institutionalised. Paradoxically, the same rhetorical 
schemes  were  developed  to  support  the  institutionalisation  and  the  attempts  to 
deinstitutionalise budgets. We are going to focus on two of these rhetorical schemes. The first 
argues that turbulence of the environment required the implementation of budgeting in the 
1930s. Likewise, since 1990, the turbulence of the environment has generated a feeling that 
budgeting  should  be  abandoned.  According  to  the  second  rhetoric,  in  the  1950s,  budgets 
contributed to the emancipation of managers. Since 1990, they have been deemed as rigid 
frameworks preventing managers from acting freely. This apparent symmetry is a means of 
understanding how the rhetorical arguments used by actors in the institutionalization process 
operate. Stemming from this is the research question which we have endeavoured to answer: 
how apparently identical rhetorical schemes could be used to justify the birth and the death of 
the institutional form which is the concept of the budget? 
The  first  section  presents  the  theoretical  framework  of  our  research,  which  focuses  in 
particular on the role of rhetorical devices and actors. The second sets out the methodology 
for our research. The third is an empirical presentation of the two periods studied: the history 
of the concepts, the content of the rhetorical devices and the role of the main actors using 
them. The fourth section is a discussion of the results of our research. 
 
1. Theoretical framework 
The  framework  of  neo-institutional  sociology  (NIS)  helps  to  explain  the  adoption  by 
organisations of institutionalized forms that legitimise their survival (Greenwood et al., 2008). 
Many studies have concerned the mechanisms of institutionalisation, that is to say the process 
by which ‘social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in 
social  thought  and  action’  (Meyer  &  Rowan,  1977,  341).  Thess  research  describe  how 
discourse on ambiguous or non-existent concepts or practices can end up being taken for 
granted (Hopwood, 1983). 
1.1 Rhetorical schemes, discourse and managerial concepts 
                                                 
1 “CAM-I is an international consortium of manufacturing and service companies, government organizations, 
consultancies,  and  academic  and  professional  bodies  who  have  elected  to  work  cooperatively  in  a  pre-
competitive environment to solve management problems and critical business issues that are common to the 
group” website CAM-I.  
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Institutionalisation can be observed at three levels: discursive, organisational and practical 
levels (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Jepperson, 1991). In the context of our research, we will 
not consider either practices or organizations, but rather the discursive forms developed by 
actors on management concepts that are taken for granted. This institutionalisation process 
results in “frameworks of programs or rules establishing identities and activity scripts for 
such  identities”  (Jepperson,  1991:146).  Accordingly,  institutionalisation  should  not  be 
regarded  as  the  mere  translation  of  such  scripts  into  practical  actions.  Indeed, 
institutionalisation  can  only  concern  discursive  forms  and  concepts  that  become 
institutionalised  independently  of  their  actual  and  effective  practices.  In  fact,  discourses, 
organisational structures and individual practices should be decoupled and regarded as three 
different dimensions of  institutionalisation. Friedland & Alford (1991)  and Powell (1991) 
consider that organisational structures and practices have been the most obvious levels of 
institutionalisation so far. However, agreeing with Jepperson, they call for further research at 
the discursive level. “The discourses not only constitute individuals, they seem to determine 
them.  Statements  […]  constitute  both  subjects  and  objects  […]  As  a  result,  we  do  not 
understand the process of how people ended up in these normalising organisations, or the 
choices through which people became participants in these historically variant discourses and 
thereby contributed to that history. Without actors, without subjectivity, there is no way to 
account for change” (Frieldand & Alford, 1991: 253-254). 
Subsequently, rhetorical schemes and the networks of actors in which they operate are part of 
the institutionalisation process. Thus, Phillips et al (2004) argue “we can see institutions are 
not  just  social  constructions  but  social  constructions  constituted  through  discourse”. 
Consequently,  management  concepts  like  institutionalised  discourse  are  themselves  the 
product of rhetorical devices that we will call rhetorical schemes. If these rhetorical schemes 
are  convincing,  then  a  managerial  concepts  will  have  even  more  chance  of  being 
institutionalised (Phillips et al. 2004, 645). 
But this research leaves unanswered a number of theoretical questions that have not been 
sufficiently, or at all, developed. Our research seeks to explore three issues involved in our 
research question. Firstly, how do we change from one institution to another and more to the 
point how does deinstitutionalisation come about? Secondly, what are the roles of rhetorical 
devices in the above two processes. Thirdly, what roles do the actors have in these processes, 
and more particularly, how can we relate them to one type of rhetoric or another? 
1.2. Changing from one institution to another  
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Neo-institutional  sociology  has  been  more  concerned  with  stability  and  the  search  for 
conformity than with change and the switching from one institutional equilibrium to another 
(Phillips & Namrata, 2008). To use the terms of Greenwood et al. (2002), while NIS has 
explored change, it has not paid sufficient attention to models of non-isomorphic change.  
While much has been written about institutionalisation, there has been much less exploration 
of deinstitutionalisation (Dacin, & Dacin, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2002, Dacin, et al., 2002; 
Oliver, 1992). According to Scott (2001: 182), deinstitutionalisation is the “process by which 
institutions weaken and disappear”. The best-known pieces of research on the subject are 
those  of  Oliver  (1992),  Zucker  (1991)  or  Hardy  &  Maguire  (2009).  Whereas 
institutionalisation  unconsciously  stems  from  the  pervasion  of  the  environment, 
deinstitutionalisation openly challenges an existing institution.  
The total disappearance of a management concept is no doubt a purely theoretical viewpoint 
as is underlined by Dacin & Dacin (2008: 348) insofar as “institutionalised [concepts] are 
rarely ever completely extinguished” or at least die out very slowly. Institutionalised concepts 
can also change. DiMaggio (1988) for example, considers that an institution is composed of 
core and ancillary elements. The former may continue to exist while the latter adapt according 
to external changes. This is a problem we will encounter in our empirical study, as while the 
BBRT  speaks  of  doing  away  with  budgeting,  we  find  it  hard  to  see  how  such  basic 
components of the budgeting process (forecasts, estimated/actual comparisons, action plans, 
etc.) could completely disappear. 
Greenwood et al. (2002) propose a model of institutional change that takes into account the 
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Although we take this model as a starting point, our own research will deviate from it. We 
will analyse a highly institutionalised situation and will only focused phase 2 of this model 
which we will compare with the previous institutionalizing phases. 
1.3. The role of rhetorical schemes in the institutionalising process 
For Greenwood et al. (2002), the process of deinstitutionalisation is brought about by jolts 
(phase 1 of their model). As Munir (2005) points out however, these events alone are not 
enough as they need to be problematised by the actors in order to be accepted. The theoretical 
framework  of  the  NIS  underlines  the  role  of  rhetoric  in  the  dissemination  and 
institutionalisation process (Phillips et al, 2004). Rhetoric legitimises managerial concepts so 
that they become taken for granted. “Rhetoric is a type of instrumental discourse used to 
persuade  audiences,  reach  reliable  judgements  or  decisions,  and  coordinate  social  action” 
(Green,  2004:  654).  Rhetoric  thus  shapes  our  aims  and  means.  It  constructs  meanings, 
identities and the world.  
Rhetoric problematises change. Several series of research studies have shown how rhetoric 
allows institutionalisation. Maguire & Hardy (2006) show how new discourse can lead to the 
creation of new institutions. Rhetoric can be the first step in the codification of institutions. 
Hasselbladh & Kallinikos (2000) examine how general ideas infiltrate discourse which in turn 
has an effect on management techniques. According to them, the process of objectification 
takes  place  in  three  stages,  from  oral  discourse,  to  writings  and  then  to  more  formal 
codification. Rhetoric can also have an impact through emotions. Green (2004) describes how 
rhetoric  moulds  practices.  Pathos  type  rhetoric  which  appeals  to  the  emotions  (fear  for 
example). Logos which refer to logical considerations (e.g. the advantages to be found). And 
finally ethos which appeals to morality and ethics (e.g. honour, tradition, justice). Finally, 
Ezzamel et al. (2007a) analyse how a discourse on accountability, in the context of school 
reforms,  allows  schools  to  be  re-institutionalised  as  a  new  institution  combined  with  old 
models. Numerous studies have demonstrated the communicative dynamics that accompany 
the  de-legitimatising  of  highly  institutionalised  forms  (Hoffman, 1999,  Arndt  &  Bigelow, 
2000, Human & Prevan, 2000, Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002, Covaleski, Dirsmisth 
& Rittenberg, 2003). In the end, it would appear that the way rhetoric operates in the creation 
of an institution is a rich and relatively unexplored field of research. 
Rhetorical schemes do not develop in an intellectual vaccum. They are part of the social and 
political contexts that they help to extend into the field of management. Firstly, rhetoric can 
be used in pre-formatted forms and categories which make it ready for use. For example, 
Norreklit (2003) analysed how the Balanced Scorecard became institutionalised through uses  
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of metaphors and analogies borrowed from scientific fields or supposedly the information age 
revolution. This study is of particular interest to us as it applies to the same "management 
guru  genre",  to  an  accounting  tool,  on  the  same  period  and  using  similar  wording  (i.e. 
information age). It shows in particular how use of imprecise and abstract concepts can be 
used to draw a maximum number of actors. Secondly, Rose & Miller (1992), Miller & Rose 
(1990),  Miller  &  O’Leary  (2007)  underlined,  even  if  their  terminology  and  focus  was 
somewhat  distinct,  the  importance  of  relations  between  discursive  forms  used  to  define 
government programmes and technologies: “The governing of conduct, it was argued, was 
achieved through the interplay between programmes and technologies, between the discursive 
and the instrumental” (Miller & O’Leary, 2007: 707). The relationship between managerial 
rhetoric and rhetoric of a more general nature must also be considered in order to understand 
better how and why rhetorical schemes work. 
1.4. Roles of rhetoric and agency 
Traditionally, the role of institutions is often passive and over-socialised and ignores their 
roles of agencies or political deviances and adaptations (Green, 2004). The theory of NIS 
even  sometimes  presents  the  actors  as  irrational  beings  who  simply  respond  to  stimuli, 
reproducing forms that already exist and thus contributing to making the world even more 
homogeneous (Lounsbury, 2008). Contrary to this actor-free vision, Lounsbury (2008: 351) 
proposes “a much more penetrating examination of actors and practices”.  
Some studies have looked at the nature of the actors that use rhetoric (Phillips et al, 2004). 
Dacin & Dacin (2008) show how deinstitutionalisation is accompanied by a change in the 
composition of the stakeholders. The new actors concerned by the institution give it new 
values and thus change its nature. Certain ideas become popular, not because of their content, 
but  because  of  the  actors  who  convey  and  support  them  and  the  way  in  which  they  are 
packaged, formulated and timed (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). The role of the actors can be taken 
into account via the rhetorical strategies they put in place to construct or dismantle institutions. 
They rationalise or give rhetorical reasons for actions. Rhetorical schemes thus have a central 
role in the dissemination of managerial concepts. 
There  have  been  few  studies  that  have  looked  into  the  actors  to  whom  the  rhetoric  is 
addressed. They may be particular classes of stakeholders, or they may be non-human
2 such 
as  categories  of  artefacts  assumed  to  be  homogeneous  (customers,  financial  markets)  for 
whom rhetoric is constructed. It is also important to examine the context and forums in which 
                                                 
2 These are artefacts, ideas, theories or methods (Latour, 2005).  
  8 
an institution is discussed (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and contested. The actors also have 
a role to play as soon as they begin to resist any changes to the institution. The custodians of 
the  old  institutions  deploy  resistance  stratagems  which  change  the  course  of  the 
deinstitutionalisation process studied. 
Institutional  logics  provide  a  link  between  individual  agency  and  cognition  and  socially 
constructed  institutional practices  and  rule  structures  (Thornton  & Ocasio,  2008).  But  we 
know little about the way the shifts in institutional logics come about (Suddaby &Greewood, 
2005).  Institutional  logics  are  “the  socially  constructed,  historical  patterns  of  material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their  material  subsistence,  organise  time  and  space,  and  provide  meanings  to  their  social 
reality”  (Thornton  &  Ocasio,  2008,  101).  According  to  Rao,  Monin  &  Durand  (2003) 
institutional logics are mutable to the extent that they rely on ambiguous language that can be 
appropriated. Institutional logics are full of contradictions that are resolved by “actors who 
have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create 
new institutions or to transform existing ones” (Hardy & Maguire, 1998, 198). Known as 
institutional entrepreneurs, these actors use these contradictions to promote new institutions 
via  their  rhetorical  schemes  (Seo  &  Creed,  2002,  Suddaby  &  Greewood,  2005, Hardy  & 
Maguire, 2008). The institutions thus take on new meanings owing to the rhetoric developed 
by  the  institutional  entrepreneurs,  not  without  some  clashes  of  interpretations.  The 
development of market logic over thirty years illustrates these changes in institutional logic 
(Rueff, 1999, quoted in Thornton & Ocasio ,2008). 
Lounsbury (2008), Sahlin & Wedlin (2008), Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum (2009) propose to 
put  the  actor  and  the  agency back  at  the  centre of  the  analysis  of  the  institutionalisation 
process and in particular suggests use of the Actor-Network Theory (Callon, 1986; Latour, 
1999; Law & Hassard, 1999). ANT introduces concepts that are useful for understanding how 
reality is formed. Rhetoric and controversy developed by actors occupy a central place. Via a 
phenomenon of translation, ie problematisation, interressement, enrolment and mobilisation 
(Callon, 1986), and incorporation of human and non-human allies, they succeed in bonding 
together a network of actors that defines the nature of the concepts studied. 
Maguire  &  Hardy  (2009)  conducted  a  study  based  on  these  different  dimensions.  They 
questioned how abandonment of institutions results from “problematisation” that – through 
subsequent “translation” - changes discourse in ways that undermine the institutional pillars 
supporting practices. This occurs through new subject positions from which actors speak and 
act in support of problematisations.   
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Rhetoric  is  one  of  the  means  used  by  institutional  entrepreneurs  to  institutionalise  and 
deinstitutionalise managerial discourse. While the rhetoric of institutionalisation has been the 
subject of much research, the rhetoric connected with deinstitutionalisation has been much 
less studied. We may nevertheless ask ourselves what are the connections between the two 
streams of rhetoric. The way these rhetorical devices work is also a subject to be treated with 
caution. Different rhetorical strategies and different ways of taking action have been revealed 
by scientific literature. But while these studies underline the importance of rhetoric, they do 
not give a clear image of their ways of taking action. Finally, institutional entrepreneurs use 
rhetoric to rephrase the contradictions that exist in institutional logics and to give meaning to 
discourse and practices. They problematise in a way that calls for further study, particularly to 
know who problematising and with what type of arguments. 
We will therefore challenge the theories on rhetoric strategy. In the example of budgeting and 
the BBRT, similar rhetorical schemes are used to institutionalise and to deinstitutionalise. The 
purpose of our paper is to show how two streams of rhetoric that are similar in appearance are 
used in both the institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation process. It strives to answer the 
research question of why two apparently identical forms of rhetoric have been developed to 
justify the birth and the death of a symbolic form of management. As it stands, this question is 
very similar to the one posed by Suddaby & Greenwood (2005): Are the rhetorical devices 
used to construct legitimacy the same as those used to deny it? 
 
2. Data and evidence 
In answer to our research question, we studied the rhetorical schemes that accompanied the 
development of budgetary control in France with that developed in the context of the BBRT 
on international settings. The rhetorical schemes used in two different periods were studied in 
order to reveal their similarities and differences. The fact that this rhetoric concerned two 
different geographical zones could however be more problematic in terms of our methodology, 
as  the  comparison  could  lack  some  homogeneity.  We  have  solved  this  problem  of 
methodology  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  our  historical  study  of  France  was  backed  up  by 
comparative international studies on the USA and Great Britain. This allowed us to put the 
local French rhetoric in an international context and thus ensure it was representative. It is 
also  important  to  note  the  extraordinary  mobility  of  budget-related  discourse  from  one 
country to another during the thirties and fifties, both through conferences and foreign authors 
cited in French papers or visits to the USA by French speakers (Berland, 1998). As regards  
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the second period, the BBRT takes examples of companies, one of the main ones of which is 
French. The example of this company is one of the three examples given in the book by Hope 
& Fraser (2003a). The discourse produced by the BBRT therefore occupies a place on the 
international scene and has definite repercussions in France, particularly in large firms who 
are informed about the discourse produced in international spheres. In spite of the different 
geographical areas, we can but think that there is considerable homogeneity and a high degree 
of permeability between the geographical zones in each of the two periods. 
Our historical and Beyond Budgeting data consists of public writings that accompanied the 
development or demise of budgeting (textbooks, articles, conference papers, etc). From these 
documents we selected extracts taking a more general look at the development of budgeting. 
We also collected public writings and some pieces of internal CAM-I documentation to back 
up our research. 
Two corpuses of texts were gathered. One concerns the 1930-1950 period and the second one 
1998-2009 (see appendix). The texts selected are by authors who are central to each of the 
two periods (recurring authors who are highly active promoters of budgetary control, or often 
cited) and significant in terms of size (writings longer than one page). The importance of the 
chosen extracts calls for two remarks. First, in terms of volume, the set of extracts containing 
programmatic elements is small compared to the total sum of purely technical extracts, which 
are  longer  and  more  detailed:  the  social  and  political  commentaries  are  often  found  in 
forewords, prefaces, introductions and conclusions of articles and books with the body of 
texts being mainly technical. In terms of social significance, however, the selected texts are 
important, all the more so as an underlying political rationale common to all can be identified. 
The rhetoric schemes are compared to those developed in the BBRT movement.  
3. Institutionalisation and the attempt to deinstitutionalise 
budgeting - some aspects of the rhetoric used 
We will begin by putting the history of budgeting and the BBRT back into context. We will 
then show that rhetoric occupies a central place in this history. We will finally present the 
content of these rhetorical schemes in order to show for whom these messages are or are not 
intended. 
3.1. From the birth to the ‘death’ of the budget 
While  the  history  of  the  budget  is  now  well  known  and  has  been  widely  studied  under 
different theoretical angles, both Chandlerian (Chandler, 1962, 1977,  Chandler  & Deams,  
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1979, Kaplan, 1984, Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Berland et Boyns, 2002, Berland & Chiapello, 
2009),  and  Foucauldian  (Miller  &  O’Leary,  1987)  or  from  the  perspective  of  the  labour 
process (Tyson (1992), Fleischman (2000) and Fleischman & Tyson (2007) …, the position 
of the BBRT (Beyond Budgeting Roundtable) is such that we need to take a closer look at it. 
Budgeting and budgetary control
3 developed from the 1920’s first in the USA and then quite 
rapidly in the early 1930’s in Great Britain and in France, following a similar pattern (Berland 
and  Boyns,  2002).  The  introduction  of  budgeting  was  justified  by  micromanagement 
problems that companies might experience. But it was also problematisation at a political and 
macro level that bound budgetary control and macro economic and social discourses. 
For Kaplan (1984), after Chandler (1962, 1977), it was the increasing size of companies that 
pushed  them  to  adopt  new  structural  forms  such  as  the  M-Form  and  to  put  in  place  the 
appropriate  management  tools  such  as  budgeting.  But  alternatives  explanations  can  be 
provided.  Thus  the  Slump  of  the  1930s  had  led  to  increased  turmoil  in  the  running  of 
businesses, by squeezing profit margins, by causing bankruptcies and by forcing businessmen 
to review their management methods. More generally and from a political French standpoint, 
businessmen of that period were looking for a “third way” between capitalism, which seemed 
to be collapsing across the Atlantic, and communism, which seemed to be triumphant in the 
Soviet Union. Budgetary control thus sprang from the need to respond to the industrial and 
political crises of the period and it then developed along with them (Berland & Chiapello, 
2009). Miller et O’Leary (1987), Rose & Miller (1992) demonstrated how such managerial 
technologies as budgeting developed as the vector of the political programmes and reasoning 
upheld  by  certain  committed  actors.  Budgeting  was  seen  as  a  management  device  that 
reflected the societal issues which justified its being adopted. 
From the end of the 1950’s, certain critical discourses called into question the practice of 
budgeting. First of all via Argyris (1952) or Hofstede (1967) and then in a more practical 
manner via zero based budgeting (Pyhrr, 1973) which had a slight impact on practices before 
falling  into  oblivion.  Hopwood  (1972,  1974)  and  the  paper  by  Barrett  &  Fraser  (1977) 
belonged to the same movement. But it was particularly since the 1990’s that there has been a 
surge  of  critical  discourse  within  the  BBRT  and  the  CAM-I.  The  CAM-I  (a  union  of 
consultants,  practitioners  and  academics)  suggested,  in  the  1990s,  different  alternative 
management  control  devices
4 .  The  position  of  Beyond  Budgeting  is  thus  a  natural 
                                                 
3 The two terms will be used with the same meaning throughout this paper. 
4 CAM-I was already acknowledged as one of the networks involved in the development of Activity-Based 
Costing in the late 1980s (Jones and Dugdale, 2002).  
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continuation from the ideas launched in the 1980’s. The network has been kept alive by a 
number of consultants who have based their businesses on this theme. But it also has outposts 
abroad where networks are growing in Germany, Australia, South and North America.  This 
network includes information technology allies who promote Beyond Budgeting management 
systems, such as in SAP. The network is structured around partners, business associates and 
auditors. Books have been published (one by the Harvard Business Press, Hope & Fraser, 
2003a),  and papers  have been published  in  a  great  many  reviews (including  the  Harvard 
Business Review). 
The BBRT proposes to do away with budgeting and claims a membership of around thirty in 
1998, sixty in 2007 and over 150 between 1999 and 2007 (Becker et al., 2009) although we 
do  not  know  if  these  members  have  effectively  stopped  using  a  budget  or  are  simply 
interested in the idea. The recommendations of the BBRT are not always clear: While they 
call for major structural reforms in which employee empowerment has an important place, the 
responses range from rolling forecasts to balanced scorecards and new management principles. 
The  various  stakeholders  even  appear  to  differ  in  opinion  or  at  least  differ  on  how  they 
understand Beyond Budgeting. Some of the responses have developed independently from 
BBRT  which is no longer their  reference, sometimes simply to set themselves apart.  For 
example, the McKinsey consulting (Aktem et al., 2005) firm has questioned the usefulness of 
the budget, based on the themes developed by the BBRT, but has not quoted them. Others 
created the Beyond Budget Transformation Network (BBTN) (Becker et al., 2009) in order to 
emphasise their conviction that the initial project has gone completely off course! 
Hope and Fraser (2003a, b) acknowledge at least three companies that effectively have gone 
Beyond  Budgeting:  Boeralis,  Rhodia  and  Svenska  Handelsbanken.  The  latter  is  explicitly 
introduced as “the” model to be followed. Despite this, budgets are unlikely to disappear 
easily. The solutions that the BBRT suggests are still to be defined. BBRT nevertheless poses 
some good questions about budgeting. 
For BBRT promoters (CAM-I, 1999), budgetary control developed in a context where the 
markets and value chains were stable, where one knew who our competitors were and could 
predict their actions, where lack of available capital was the main hindrance to growth and 
learning, where business structures were centralised and their coordination had an essentially 
pyramid-shaped structure, where the life cycle of products and business strategies were spread 
over a longer period of time, and finally, where operatives were required to comply with the 
rules. At best, it favoured incremental innovation (and sometimes immobility) but it did not 
allow radical changes to be considered.   
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Budgeting  gives  more  consideration  to  the  constraints  involved  in  production  than  in 
customer  satisfaction.  In  this  respect,  budgetary  control  is  a  tool  for  managing  a  supply 
market rather than a demand market. In the same vein, the creation of wealth was not a result 
of optimisation but of innovation. Finally, budgeting allowed capital to be rationed (allocation 
of resources) whereas today the resource that is considered rare is no longer capital but know-
how, knowledge-sharing and optimisation. 
Furthermore, budgeting does not reveal good performance indicators (CAM-I, 1999). While 
the  important  thing  for  a  business  is  to  maximize  value  for  the  shareholders,  budgeting 
focuses too much on accounting indicators, whose limits are all well known when we are 
seeking to measure the creation of value. In other words, budgeting allows us to control costs 
while what we should be controlling is value. 
Finally,  to  favour  innovation  in  business,  managers  seek  to  tap  the  available  energy  and 
creativity. But budgeting has completely the opposite effect (CAM-I, 1999) by imposing a 
strict hierarchical structure necessary for strong coordination. There is therefore a need to 
switch between control exercised from the centre (general management), which predominates 
in budgeting, and the increased freedom managers need to increase the value of the business. 
It is the concept of decentralisation that is questioned here (CAM-I, 1999). 
These ideas also have repercussions in France in companies such as Rhodia (often mentioned 
by the BBRT), Bull and Carnaudmetalbox directed by Jean-Marie Descarpentrie. Other firms 
show  interest  in  the problematic, but  do  not  dare  take  the plunge  and  put  the  ideas  into 
practice. It is true that the practical side of the issue is not always clearly presented in the 
discourse of the BBRT. 
These critiques need to be analysed in terms of the calling into question of a practice that has 
been taken for granted and their contribution to a better understanding of the phenomenon of 
change  in  neo-institutional  sociology.  While  NIS  usually  focuses  on  the  stability  and 
permanence of certain phenonema, what we are exploring here are these moments of change 
when an accepted, institutionalised practice is called into question. It is no doubt too early to 
speak of successful deinstitutionalisation (supposing that it actually exists, Dacin & Dacin, 
2008) but it is an attempt in that direction that we are witnessing with the BBRT.  
3.2. The central role of rhetoric in both periods 
When budgeting was first disseminated, this took place in three phases: some initial practices, 
large-scale dissemination of discursive arguments in the form of rhetoric justifying the need 
for budgeting and budgetary control, and the subsequent generalisation of budgeting practices.  
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We again find the same process with the BBRT, which supports our having placed rhetoric at 
the centre of our analysis. 
Whereas budgeting appeared quite early in business practices, it was only used to a limited 
degree and by a small number of firms. It was only in the 1950’s and especially the 1960’s 
that there was a significant number of experiments with budgeting both in the USA and in 
Europe (Berland & Boyns, 2002). By the 1960’s, budget and budgeting control had become 
concepts or even practices that were highly institutionalised and taken for granted. 
In the meantime, there was a lot written and said about budgeting (always by the same actors 
from the same firms. Dissemination of the idea of budgetary control occurred in both France 
and Britain during the interwar years and following World War II. Taking the literature first, 
books were written on the subject, and so too were articles, appearing in both mainstream 
accounting  journals  and  specialist  trade  and  business  journals
5 .  The  lack  of  any 
comprehensive  bibliography  of  publications  on  the  topic  of  budgetary  control  for  either 
France or Britain, and the variety of forms that such work could take, makes it difficult to 
determine  precisely  the  pace  of  dissemination  of  information  on  budgetary  control. 
Nevertheless, the bibliography by Satet (1936), although clearly incomplete, particularly in 
respect of British writings, indicates that, in the 1920s, European progress in this respect was 
slow compared to that in the USA, though it did pick up in the early 1930s. 
This  rhetoric,  in  the  form  of  articles  and  conferences,  appeared  several  years  before  the 
institutionalisation of practices had become definitive. We can see the same patterns as those 
observed  by  other  research  into  practices  where  rhetoric  had  preceded  implementation 
(Bjornenak, 1997). This rhetoric contributed to the process of institutionalisation by offering 
examples  of  implementations  and  above  all  accounts  justifying  the  use  of  the  technique. 
Budgetary control is an innovation that was seized upon by a network composed of many 
spokespersons and allies who had an interest in promoting it. In France we have the American 
consultants Clark & White who write about the connections between different countries and 
the basic practices of businesses. We also have professionals such as Benoit from the firm 
Pechiney  or  Loeb  of  Le  Printemps  giving  first  hand  accounts  of  their  experiences. 
Surprisingly,  it  is  always  the  same  firms  that  are  given  as  an  example.  There  are  also 
academics or what we would now call researchers, such as Satet, who has produced around 
fifty publications on the topic over a period of 20 years. Between the wars, the group of 
                                                 
5 In Britain, these included The Cost Accountant, The Accountant, The Engineer, The Engineering Magazine, 
The Mechanical Engineer, Cassier’s Magazine (later Industrial Management), while in France there were La 
Comptabilité, Mon Bureau, Organisation, Méthodes, Le Commerce, L’Usine, etc.  
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individuals most actively engaged in the processes of disseminating and diffusing budgetary 
control in both Britain and France, amongst whom were accountants, consultants and those 
who had been engaged in managing firms where the technique had been introduced, was a 
relatively small one. Although individuals such as Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree,  Lyndall 
Urwick and Charles Renold in Britain and Robert Satet, Paul Loeb and Gaston Commesnil in 
France,  were  highly  active  and  part  of  a  relatively  tight-knit  group,  both  nationally  and 
internationally, their number was small, reducing their impact. Apart from such individuals, 
we  can  not  ignore  the  role played by  interest  groups  in  management  and  trade  who  met 
regularly through professional associations who served as intermediaries between different 
networks. The most well-known of these  actants are the Commission d’Etudes Générales 
d’Organisation du Travail (Cégos - a group of practitioners who promoted benchmarks), the 
Comité National de l’Organisation Française (CNOF - a group of practitioners who met Fayol 
and Taylor’s disciples), and the Union des Industries Métallurgiques et Minières (UIMM - a 
branch of the coal and steel employers’ federation). These ever-evolving networks penetrated 
each other and had numerous members in common who acted as spokespersons to spread the 
“gospel”, build hard facts and stabilise them thanks to numerous implementations in diverse 
companies.  This  situation  could  also  be  found  in  other  countries.  In  Britain,  where  the 
management movement was very fragmented before the Second World War (Brech, 1997), 
some organisations did provide a forum for discussions on budgetary control, most notably 
the  Management  Research  Groups  (MRGs),  established  under  the  auspices  of  Benjamin 
Seebohm Rowntree and Lyndall Urwick in the late 1920s (Boyns, 1998a), and the Institute of 
Industrial Administration (IIA) founded by E.T. Elbourne c.1919-21. 
In symmetry with what we have seen when budgeting was institutionalised, we again see with 
the BBRT that rhetoric seems to precede practice. While only a limited number of firms have 
actually eliminated budgeting according to a great number of surveys (Ekholm., & Wallin, 
2000; Libby & Lindsay, 2010; Østergren & Stensaker, 2010), there have been a great many 
writings  giving practical examples
6 and justifying the need  and possibility  of managing  a 
business without budgetary control (Becker et al., 2009). It is these writings, discursive forms 
and rhetoric that are the subject of our research. At this stage, it could be argued that rhetoric 
preceded  practice.  We  can  observe  the  same  pattern  during  the  first  stages  of 
institutionalisation: we have some isolated applications followed by an abundance of rhetoric. 
                                                 
6  Always the same ones, and in particular Svenska Handelsbanken which was the counterpart of General Motors 
in Beyond Budgeting!  
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The possible outcome, ie practices, of this is of no importance. Our study effectively only 
concerns the first two phases of the institutionalisation process. 
The network of actors engaged in promoting the BBRT is very similar to what we observed 
during the 1930’s in Europe. We can but list the main actors who mirror their predecessors.  
Robin Fraser, Director of International Operations is a management consultant, formerly a 
partner in the UK with Coopers & Lybrand. Jeremy Hope, Research Director is the author of 
a number of articles and books on performance management and associated leadership issues. 
His  article  on  Beyond  Budgeting  with  Robin  Fraser  won  the  IFAC  award  for  best 
management accounting article of 1998. Peter Bunce, Director BBRT Europe is Director of 
BBRT Europe and a co-founder of the BBRT. Prior to the BBRT, Peter Bunce managed 
several CAM-I Programs relating to computer-aided process planning, geometric modelling, 
factory management and sculptured surfaces. He spent 13 years in industry in Manufacturing 
Engineering working at various levels for several companies, both large and small. He was 
awarded a PhD for research into the practical applications of Group Technology (Cellular 
Manufacturing).  
Besides this team of three high-profile personalities, there were other members came from the 
world  of  consulting  or  business  and  (to  a  lesser  degree)  from  the  academic  world.  For 
example, Steve Player, Director BBRT North America serves as the North American Program 
Director for the Beyond Budgeting Round Table and is the CEO of The Player Group, a 
Dallas,  Texas  based  consulting  firm.  Niels  Pflaeging,  BBRT  Director  South  America  is 
located  in  São  Paulo,  Brazil.  He  is president  of  MetaManagement  Group,  a  management 
consulting firm serving clients in Europe and South America. Franz Röösli, Director BBRT 
DACH (German speaking countries) is the Beyond Budgeting Round Table Director for the 
German-speaking countries (BBRT DACH). He is located in Basel, Switzerland, where he is 
professor for controlling and management processes at the University of Applied Sciences 
Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW). 
Many individuals from the business world were asked to contribute, either as auditors (CAM-
I  acting  as  a  sort  of  training  centre  here)  or  as third parties  who  came  to  speak  of  their 
experiences. By the time of the June 2002 White Paper, CAM-I declared having contributions 
from  60  businesses.  Certain  participants  are  qualified  as  Business  Associates,  others  are 
Academic Associates. The network also includes Partner Links. 
We are thus working on a symmetrical situation in which the rhetoric of the thirties and fifties 
supported budgeting and that of the nineties supported its abandonment. In both cases, the 
rhetoric preceded practice and sought to justify it. The rhetoric of the two periods was backed  
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up by networks that were organised in a similar way. We therefore have a similar market for 
each type of rhetoric. 
We will now examine the rhetoric developed by  the actors to justify the adoption or the 
abandonment of budgeting. There is a striking similarity between the arguments put forward 
against budgeting and those in support of it, as we will see in the following sections. There 
are two arguments that are particularly characteristic of this similar rhetoric: a) the turbulence 
of the environment and b) the need to release available energy and decentralise management. 
The same arguments seem to be used to justify both stances. 
3.3.The similarities of rhetorical schemes 
We  will  study  two  similar  rhetorical  schemes  that  support  the  institutionalisation  and 
deinstitutionalisation  of  budgeting:  turbulence  and  emancipation.  These  rhetoric  schemes 
have been chosen owing to their recurrence in the literature of both periods. They pose the 
question of their role in justifying one thing and its opposite. One concerns the 1930’s and the 
other the 1950’s with regard to the birth of budgeting. Both rhetoric schemes are re-used by 
the BBRT. 
Turbulent markets – the argument for and against budgeting 
Environment turbulences were invoked to justify budgeting in the 1930s. Following the great 
depression, some actors considered that budgeting would be a solution to the crisis. 
Various  promoters  of  budgeting  were  thus  engaged  in  diverse  organisations  as  CNOF, 
Cegos… where political and economic answers to the crisis were devised jointly (Berland & 
Chiapello, 2009). They endeavoured to persuade the French élite and governments of the 
necessity to develop national and corporate planning. However after WWII this justification 
disappeared. It left room for a second stream of rhetorical schemes based on decentralisation. 
During the 1990’s, CAM-I members used the turbulence of the environment as an argument 
for suppressing budgets. This was considered as an inconvenient device in a context where 
reactions and continuous adaptations are the definitive solution to management issues. The 
new  market  power  of  customers,  competitor  reactions  and  technical  progress  have  made 
planning  impossible.  On  the  contrary,  managing  without  budget  would  allow  developing 
rolling  forecasts  in  order  to  adapt  better  to  an  ever-changing  market.  New  critical  value 
drivers would supposedly replace economies of scale, e.g. velocity, organisational learning, 
customer relationships. 
Budgeting appeared as being unsuitable for its "new" environment. According to CAM-I and 
its supporters, budgeting belonged to an era where the competition was stable and predictable:  
  18 
“The golden age of planning and control: market conditions and value chains were 
stable, competitors were known and their actions were predictable, capital was the 
primary constraint on growth and improvement, centralisation and hierarchy was the 
chosen  management  form,  strategy  and  product  lifecycles  were  lengthy,  the 
management behaviour required was one of compliance with rules and procedures.” 
(CAM-I, 1999: 23) 
“For  many  years,  the  traditional  budgeting  model  did  the  job  reasonably  well.  It 
worked well when market conditions were stable, competitors were known and their 
actions  were  predictable,  decisions  were  made  at  corporate  headquarters,  prices 
reflected internal costs, strategy and product life cycles were fairly lengthy, customers 
had limited choices, and the priority of shareholders was good stewardship. But, as 
you are keenly aware, these conditions no longer apply.” (Doc SAP, 2001: 5) 
The  “new”  business  environment,  deemed  to  be  more  turbulent,  marked  by  increased 
competition and the impossibility to make reliable forecasts, had “become” incompatible with 
budgeting… 
“Many other weaknesses of budgeting are well known. For example, they assume a 
stable planning cycle of at least twelve months – an unlikely prospect for most firms in 
today’s turbulent world.” (CAM-I, 1999: 11) 
“[Budgets] fail to provide the CEO with reliable numbers, both current and forecast. 
Budgets are typically extrapolations of existing trends with little attention being paid 
to  anticipatory  models.  […]  Budgets  as  a  basis  for  forecasting  are  incapable  of 
providing  the  information  managers  now  need  to  anticipate  future  events  and  test 
strategic alternatives. […] Budgets were an excellent tool for planning and controlling 
performance  and  managing  resources  when  the  competitive  climate  was  relatively 
stable and firms could reasonably plan a year or more ahead.” (CAM-I, 1999: 41-44) 
…  or  rather,  budgeting  was  not  a  tool  that  was  appropriate  for  the  turbulent  business 
environment, contrary to Beyond Budgeting: 
“[Good control systems] should be concerned with helping managers anticipate the 
future and ensuring that the right questios are asked and the right decisions taken that 
add maximum long-term value. It is hard to see how these changes can be managed 
successfully while leaving the traditional budgeting and control systems in place.” 
(CAM-I, 1999: 22) 
In  this  “new  environment”,  businesses  need  to  control  new  keys  to  success,  such  as 
innovation, speed of execution, customer relations, learning:  
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“It is now clear that companies can no longer plan and control their way in the future. 
To be successful in the new economy, managers need to learn to think in different 
ways. They must systematically challenge management orthodoxies, most of which 
are taken as a given or constraint […]. The new performance management model has, 
therefore, to focus on innovation, speed, customers, and learning, rather than planning 
and control.” (CAM-I, 1999: 12) 
“Today’s  competitive  climate  is  far  more  uncertain,  the  pace  of  innovation  is 
increasing, costs reflect market pressures, customers are fickle, and shareholders more 
demanding.” (Andersen Business Consulting, 2001: 5). 
It is rolling forecasts that now allow businesses to adapt to their new environment: 
“The proacted annual planning cycle disappears as flexible event-driven strategies and 
rolling forecasts become the springboard for rapid action. Managers aim for ‘stretch’ 
targets  as  these  are  divorced  from  performance  and  rewards.  And  investment  and 
improvement programs are committed as and when the time is right rather than being 
squeezed into some artificial window of time.” (CAM-I, 1999: 13). 
“Although most firms use regular forecasts, these tend to be geared to estimating year-
end performance and thus become shorter and shorter the nearer the year-end becomes. 
In  other  words,  they  are  focused  on  achieving  budgeted  numbers  and  not  helping 
managers to anticipate future events. […] Forecasts must be seen as a tool for strategic 
management and learning, not control.” (CAM-I, 1999: 115). 
But  budgeting  had  also  been  introduced  as  an  answer  to  economic  instability.  Although 
criticised by the supporters of CAM-I for its so-called incompatibility with the turbulence that 
characterised  the  “new”  economic  environment  of  the  late  1990’s,  budgeting  had  been 
introduced in the 1930’s as an answer to the increasing uncertainty of the market. 
“It can be argued that it is easier said than done, that in particular it is not possible to 
make  reliable  forecasts  especially  during  such  times  as  those  we  are  currently 
experiencing.” (Penglaou, 1934: 511-515). 
“The  present  recession  grants  special  importance  to  economic  factors,  and  to  the 
economic balancing of industrial affairs." (Germain, 1932a: 6). 
In  the  face  of  such  growing  uncertainty  that  was  characteristic  of  the  economic 
environment of the 1930’s, budgeting procedures were seen as an efficient solution to 
“restore order” to a business.  
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“From one essential viewpoint, the main aim of budgeting is to provide a way of 
controlling, restricting and stabilizing the fluctuating volume of business which would 
otherwise be irregular.” (Ludwig, 1930a: 390). 
“We can’t stress enough the importance for businesses of maintaining their stability 
and their organization, and the continuity in the way they are run.” (Musil, 1930: 398) 
It is also interesting to note that, from the time it was first introduced, budgeting was not 
presented as needing to be very precise and detailed: 
“We  can  see  that  the  results  are  by  definition  approximate.  But  this  information, 
regardless of its inaccuracy, is preferable to an intuitive vision unsupported by any 
experience.” (Pengalou, 1931: 623) 
“The accuracy of this data is secondary; nobody is requiring it to be precise. It is even 
doubtful that it corresponds, globally, to any future reality. Can a financier guess how 
sales are going to develop?” (Ludwig, 1930b: 1) 
First presented as a tool to help businesses to adapt, budgeting is even considered by 
some as a reaction to the turbulence of the outside environment of a business, a way of 
restricting or even dominating it: 
“We can define budgeting as an attempt to predict and take measures to use all reliable 
information available and limit the speculative effects of capitalism." (Pulvermann, 
1930: 400) 
“I think that, if budgeting had been generalised in industry worldwide, we would not 
have had the irrational excessive production we are seeing in most sectors and as a 
result,  the  present  recession  would  not  have  had  the  catastrophic  intensity  we  are 
experiencing.” (Jadot, 1931: 293) 
The actors propose to use budgeting to help them to face up to an increasingly turbulent 
environment,  knowing  that  the  world  in  which  they  work  is  not  easy  and  that  making 
forecasts is not simple: 
“One of the main objections concerns the value of economic forecasts. In this matter, 
we should not be afraid to say that any attempt to anticipate the future is a precarious 
exercise. [   ] there remains the possibility of using internal statistics which, when they 
exist [   ] can and must provide useful information to delimit at least the not too distant 
future. […] Everything finally depends on the individual company. In some companies 
changes can occur very quickly. But for the majority, it must be said that prognostics 
can be made judiciously and usefully providing that no absolute value is accorded to 
these forecasts." (Pengalou, 1935: 66).  
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It is perhaps even this that is paradoxical: if the forecasts are simple to make, they have no use, 
but if on the other hand they are difficult to make, and thus involve an amount of prudence, 
they are more likely to be useful: 
“If we are unable to make forecasts, this does not always mean that we haven’t done 
the job properly. We first of all need to find the reasons. What a manager must check 
above all, is how much effort has been put into them.” (Wiliquet, 1947: 50) 
“In any case, especially at the beginning, there will always be a difference between the 
forecasts  and  the  actual  figures.  These  divergences  are  necessary  as  they  have  an 
intrinsic advantage: during a financial year, a great many internal or external factors 
will change, thus bringing about differences that need to be analysed in order to gain 
from them” (Satet, 1936: 60). 
Paradoxically, from the 1930’s we find the idea that forecasts serve to promote the need to 
constantly adapt, or to compare oneself with competitors as a benchmark for improvement. 
We  may  say  then  that  we  are  very  close  to  such  practices  as  rolling  forecasting  and 
benchmarking promoted by CAM-I. 
“We  have  said  that  budgeting  methods  need  to  be  flexible  enough  to  adapt,  if 
necessary, to a new order of things. If we have to take care that all employees carry 
out the programs defined ultimately by the management, it is not possible to prevent 
individual initiatives and prevent certain events that have not been perceived or that 
are perhaps even unforeseeable, from occurring. In fact, a true budgeting system not 
only involves forecasting and controlling, but continual adaptation.” (Pengalou, 1934: 
70-71). 
“What do we expect from a budget? Not rigorous accuracy, which is very difficult or 
even impossible to achieve, but sufficient accuracy to be able to monitor and control 
the activity of each autonomous workstation. They have a role of offering comparative 
scales of values with regard to the results recorded during the financial year. Each item 
of expenditure carefully calculated beforehand offers an overview of the next financial 
year whose trends are thus perceptible" (Satet, 1936: 56) 
The  history  of  budgeting  thus  shows  that  it  was  put  in  place  in  the  1930’s  because  the 
environment was already perceived as being turbulent. At that time, it was already difficult to 
draw up a precise budget, but the act of doing so was also, and above all, seen as a means of 
disciplining management practices and more broadly, capitalism.  
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For or against budgeting as a means of liberating employees? 
During the 1950s, budgeting was considered as a way of emancipating managers from the 
traditional hierarchy. This rhetorical scheme appeared during the 1930s but remained limited 
to  the  exceptional  Bata  case.  This  rhetorical  scheme  exploded  after  WWII.  Since  then, 
managers had become their own boss. They had been leading their business thanks to their 
budget, i.e. their own income statement. Productivity missions supported the development of 
such a rhetorical scheme. These were to react to WWII dictatorships.  
Emancipation  is  also  the  rhetorical  scheme  adopted  by  BBRT  members  to  justify  the 
abandonment of budgeting. According to them, budgets have trapped people in bureaucratic 
business and have prevented from them reacting to new challenges adequately. Devolution 
has  been  the  key  concept  for  analysing  this  situation.  From  then  on,  empowerment  has 
supposedly resulted in managers exploiting all their capabilities. 
CAM-I promoted “devolution” or “radical” decentralisation as the answer to budgeting issues. 
Abandoning  the  budget  can  release  the  energies  of  actors  hidebound  in  avoidable 
administrative constraints: 
“[Budgets]  encourage  centralised  planning  and  incremental  thinking.  […]  They 
reinforce the command and control management model and thus undermine attempts 
at  organisational  change  such  as  team  working,  delegation  and  empowerment.” 
(CAM-I, 1999: 11 and 41) 
“Many companies have, of course, decentralised their operations. But this is where we 
must be careful with words (like decentralisation). In many organisations this simply 
means  creating  lower  levels  of  centralised  decision-making,  for  example,  at  the 
divisional or large business unit level.” (CAM-I, 1999: 31) 
This new found freedom of managers is expressed through the concept of “devolution” 
which revisits that of decentralisation: 
“Finding the right balance between top-down control and bottom-up empowerment is 
at the heart of the beyond budgeting model. […] To delegate decision-making to a 
level that enables managers to run their part of the business effectively and respond 
rapidly to market forces. […] Redefine management roles around the need to support 
devolution, not around support for the organisational hierarchy. […] Real devolution 
means being ‘non-centralised’ rather than ‘decentralised’.” (CAM-I, 1999: 12) 
It means giving more freedom to the actors in order to empower them more: 
“Give managers the responsibility and freedom to act and deliver results, don’t micro-
manage them. […] There also needs to be a set of principles governing how business  
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and work units operate both independently and  together as a coherent set of units 
working for the good of the whole firm. […] unit managers [should] stop fighting each 
other and start fighting the external competition. […] it means the devolution of power 
and  authority  within  a  sort  of  federal  network  of  autonomous  units  […].  Small 
independent units also stimulate entrepreneurial activity.” (CAM-I, 1999: 23) 
The introduction of budgeting in the 1930’s already had the goal of giving employees more 
freedom.  This rhetoric of the time, which we can observe in the verbatims of the following 
actors only accentuated after the Second World War (Berland & Chiapello, 2009): 
“This  system,  which  results  in  a  certain  "decentralization"  of  management 
responsibilities, often desirable, will be of interest.” (Germain, 1932b: 33) 
“It is what we may call "remote steering" to use a colourful expression borrowed from 
Mr Edmond Landauer, or in our case "remote control". (Pengalou, 1931: 729) 
“We  can  assert  that  we  consider  to  be  just  the  principle  recommending,  to  avoid 
unpleasant friction, that budget figures be determined with the help of the sales staff, 
by  asking  for  their  opinions  and  binding  them  by  their  own  information.  […] 
Budgeting incites responsibility. » (Ludwig, 1930b: 20). 
The  image  of  this  sought-after  decentralisation  is  extreme  as  it  aims  to  transform  each 
employee into an autonomous "manager": 
“Each department will have its own accounting system, as if it were a separate firm. It 
will  keep  its  books,  draw  up  its  profit  and  loss  account  and  monthly  operating 
account.” (Commesnil, 1935: 55). 
“Each  employee  of  the  management  departments  must  learn  to  count  in  terms  of 
capital, they must all know the capital locked as a result of the decisions they make." 
“These budgets create the accounting autonomy of the departments and workshops 
and,  without  necessarily  going  so  far  as  the  Thomas  Bat'a  method  in  which  each 
workshop sells its production to the next workshop, who checks that the products meet 
the specified requirements, we can not recommend more the autonomy of each group, 
as autonomy generates responsibility. But “autonomy” does not mean “bulkheads”, 
nor does it mean rivalities between departments." (Satet, 1936: 17) 
This model, which paints the employee as being his own “boss” reached its apogee during the 
1930's in the Bat'a firm
7. This example illustrates particularly well how ideology can form the 
basis for business practices. The Czech shoemaking firm is no doubt the most admired model, 
                                                 
7 Or “Bata” pronounced Batja according to our peers.  
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or  at  least  the  model  most  cited  as  a  model  of  organisation,  particularly  by  those  who 
supported the development of budgetary control. Thus according to Landauer (1933), Thomas 
Bat’a, the founder of the company, made a dual contribution. He first placed an emphasis on 
sales and related techniques, in order to ensure the highest volume of business possible. He 
then develops the organisation, by defining homogeneous centres of responsibility. These two 
achievements can not be considered outside the social concerns of the company owner. Bat’a 
wished to ensure the material livelihood of his workers. Having himself began his career as a 
worker, he was very sensitive to their living conditions. He thus engaged in actions which 
may at first sight be qualified as paternalistic, building hospitals, schools, encouraging home-
ownership, etc. 
But  Bat’a’s  motivation  went  further  than  this.  His  “main  idea  is  to  change  workers' 
mentalities from those of the worker to those of the entrepreneur" (Landauer, 1933). At the 
head of each workshop, he places a supervisor who works for the firm but who, with his 
workers, forms an autonomous team. The various workshops communicate by means of an 
internal selling price system. The purpose was to make the workers as autonomous as possible 
and to “put them in the boss’s shoes” inspired by the method developed in France by Lucien 
Rosengart and known by the name of the “little boss method” (Landauer, 1933). In addition, 
with  particular  appeal  for  the  French,  this  allowed  Cartesian  principles  to  be  applied  to 
business issues in order to reduce the complexity facing company owners (Dubreuil, 1937). If 
work had already been broken down with regard to the workers, design and organisation were 
still centralised. It was indeed the aim of Bat’a to give more responsibility to the actors of a 
firm. 
In the end, we do not exactly know if budgeting frees workers or actually locks them inside 
absurd structures. If both sets of arguments are valid, what could have happened between the 
two eras which enables us to understand the similarity of the arguments put forwards? 
3.4. Actors, allies and problematisation 
The actors and networks supporting the institutionalisation of budgeting and the BBRT do not 
differ much from one period to the other. In support of institutionalising budgeting were some 
individuals as Clark, Héranger, KB White, Satet… while Hope & Fraser are advocates of 
BBRT. Professionals and businesses were called upon in both periods (Alsthom, Pechiney, Le 
Printemps, Electricité de Strasbourg, etc. as regards budgeting and Svenska Handelsbanken, 
Rhodia, Borealis, etc. as regards BBRT). It is worth noting that the firms quoted as examples 
continue to be small in number and are often cited by the promoters. In both cases, identical  
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institutional vectors in the form of think tanks were involved (Cegos, Cnof then CAM-I and 
BBRT). And of course, the same rhetoric is used to argue either for or against budgets. 
These rhetoric schemes, however similar their content and means of dissemination may be, 
are  not  however  addressed  to  the  same  category  of  actors.  The  discourse  is  in  fact 
problematised for an auditorium which, while not acting directly, certainly has a guiding role 
in  the  actions  taken.  These  “passive”  actors  are  those  in  whose  name  the  budget  is, 
symbolically  speaking  at  least,  institutionalised,  and  on  behalf  of  whom  an  attempt  to 
deinstitutionalise it is being made. These allies are called upon and enrolled by the rhetoric of 
the “active” supporters. The rhetoric developed aims to reduce the contradictions contained in 
the old institutional logics. 
Reducing uncertainty for sharholders and the financial markets 
During  the  1930’s,  there  was  a  wish  to  domesticate  the  growing  uncertainty,  as  it  was 
perceived,  of  the  business  environment  in  order  to  optimise  their  internal  production 
processes. As can be seen from verbatim company reports, firms and their executives were 
seeking a way of working so as to have predictable horizons that were compatible with their 
own specific management methods.  
Budgeting  “technology”  was  thus  integrated  into  more  general  “programmes”  and 
“problematisations” which contributed to give their present meaning to them (Miller et Rose, 
1990; Miller et O’Leary, 1994). Turbulence was a macro-economic problem that had to be 
controlled. We are not far away from Keynesian theory which was just taking off at that time. 
The development of a statistics-based industry also generated some hope that the uncertainty 
of the markets could be increasingly controlled (Desrosières, 1998). In addition, the degree of 
accuracy of the forecasts did not appear particularly important. Forecasts do not need to be 
exact to be useful. They are simply a steering aid that helps us to know where we are going 
and what to do. 
In  the  1990’s  however,  what  the  actors  wanted  were  certitudes,  regarding  the  financial 
markets  in  particular.  It  was  fear  of  uncertainty  rather  than  the  effects  of  inaccurate 
forecasting on budgeting that prevailed at this time. Is this not what all shareholders dream of, 
not to be faced with bad news when the quarterly results come out? In the 1930’s, it was 
accepted that the forecasts were not perfectly accurate by the very actors to whom they were 
mainly  intended.  But  in  the  1990’s,  it  is  as  if  the  entities  for  whom  these  forecasts  are 
intended, now external to the firm, were unable to accept any uncertainty. 
It would appear through verbatim that it is not uncertainty, whether real or perceived, that 
matters,  but  rather  those  who  are  at  the  receiving  end  of  the  discourse.  In  the  1930’s,  
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budgeting aimed to overcome uncertainty for the common good. In the 1990’s, uncertainty is 
something to be feared and avoided so as not to lose face with shareholders and have to 
publish profit warnings. In more general terms, it would appear that this shows a preference 
on the part of the actors for the present time and for short term management.  
Get rid of the boss simply to fall under the tyranny of the markets 
Budgeting was presented in the 1930’s as a means to liberate managers and turn them into 
“little bosses” according to the terms used at that time. It was pressure from the top that was 
seen as an increasingly unbearable constraint. The oppression of the foreman, the head of 
department or owner-manager was omnipresent. Budgeting made it possible to envisage a 
change from direct supervision to remote supervision. While direct top down management 
relaxed a little with the institutionalising of budgeting, this did not however mean that there 
was no longer any pressure. The problem of Beyond Budgeting appears to involve three types 
of pressure: 
The financial markets. As we explained above, Beyond Budgeting is justified with regard to 
external stakeholders seeking greater visibility. Nothing is worse than failing to meet one’s 
budget  estimates.  Beyond  Budget  management  no  longer  serves  to  set  internal  targets  so 
much as to provide forecasts. Confusion between forecasts and targets thus creates a tension 
that is directly felt by the managers. 
Customers. They have needs and demands that complicate budgeting. By demanding new 
products that are custom-designed and highly specific, they make standardised production 
impossible and thus make budgeting more complicated. The key to competitiveness is no 
longer planning but flexibility and the ability to constantly adapt, which are light years from 
budget stability. Budgeting is a straightjacket that prevents managers from adapting and again 
creates tension for them. 
Competitors. Firms that put in place budgetary control in the 1930’s did so in an environment 
that they had succeeded in appeasing. Paradoxically, while budgeting was supposed to reduce 
uncertainty,  it  was  only  technically  possible  when  forecasting  became  possible  (Berland, 
1999). The 1990’s saw all the facilities companies had enjoyed in the 1930’s disappear. There 
were no longer any cartels, the economy was one of demand rather than supply and borders 
had disappeared; all this made it more necessary to monitor competitor reactions. 
Pressure and the sense of being handcuffed no longer came from within the firm via the boss, 
but  rather  from  what  was  going  on  outside  the  firm:  financial  markets,  customers  and 
competitors. The feeling of oppression from which release was sought was no longer the same 
and concerned different realities or networks of actors.  
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In the 1990’s, while budgeting ensnares managers in bureaucratic processes, it is no longer 
with regard to the boss that the constraints are felt. It is the customer, the shareholder or the 
competitor  that  exerts  their  power  over  managers  by  imposing  their  choices  on  them. 
Budgeting however, which is solely directed towards the internal optimisation of a business, 
does not aid in adapting to these demands. The actors are now the customer, the shareholder 
or the competitor, new actors that were not part of the rhetoric of the 1930’s. 
 
4. Discussion 
Our  research  contributes  firstly  to  the  exploration  of  the  role  of  rhetoric  in  the 
institutionalisation  process.  Secondly,  it  extends  this  exploration  to  deinstitutionalisation 
processes. Our observations thirdly enable various postulations to be made to elaborate on 
current theory on the above processes. 
Our  research  contributes  to  existing  studies  of  the  role  of  rhetoric  in 
institutionalisation/deinstitutionalisation  processes.  Rhetoric  content  alone  can  not  explain 
observed changes. This idea is not however obvious to everybody. According to Maguire & 
Hardy  (2009,  2006),  Munir  (2005),  Phillips  et  al.  (2004),  for  institutions  to  change,  the 
discourse  must  change  too.  But  we  have  shown  that  the  same  rhetoric  can  result  in 
institutionalisation and in the opposite effect. The rhetoric at work in the two periods studied 
is indeed very similar. The words used have of course evolved over the seventy years that 
separate the two periods. But the ideas behind the two processes remain astonishingly similar 
and are borrowed from standard rhetoric. The need to put budgeting in place or to eliminate it 
is justified by evoking increasing uncertainty and the need to give managers more freedom. 
There is more going on than simply words and ideas. For Munir (2005), new institutions 
require new rhetoric to support them. The situation would appear a little more complex in our 
case. Old rhetoric is used to justify an attempted change. It is true that budgeting has not yet 
been abandoned as an institution, and it may never be so, but the institutional black box has 
been opened under the impulsion of a rhetoric that is very similar to that which brought about 
its institutionalisation. Use of rhetoric thus appears to be a necessary condition, but is not 
sufficient to explain the change. It would appear that the aim of the rhetoric is to arouse the 
emotions  of  actors by  appealing  to  their pathos (Green,  2004).  The  rhetoric  such  as  that 
developed by the management gurus seems to be steeped in registers that do not change over 
time. As argued by Clark & Greatbatch (2002), these gurus invariably develop rhetoric to  
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obtain greater certainty, control and predictability in order to reassure actors operating in a 
world that appears chaotic, unstable and increasingly uncertain. 
Proposition 1: the content of the rhetoric used to justify change is not sufficient to 
explain the institutionalisation/deinstitutionalisation process 
The problematisation of management concepts is not merely the expression of an idea. Above 
and beyond the words, it is the context, together with its actors, in which rhetoric is used that 
needs to be studied. Contrary to what has been postulated (Phillips et al. 2004), the important 
thing is not the actors that vehicle the rhetoric, but rather those to whom it is addressed in 
order to enrol them. It is they who are the real actors differentiating the two periods. Meaning 
is  not  given  by  the  content  of  the  rhetoric,  but  it  is  problematised  by  institutional 
entrepreneurs as argued by Maguire & Hardy (2006) according to the actors enrolled. This 
negotiation does not depend so much on words as on the network of stakeholders involved in 
each period. 
In each periods, both the institutional entrepreneurs seeking to promote budgeting and the 
BBRT have very similar characteristics. Each time, consultants lead networks (Cnof, Cegos, 
BBRT) in which professionals offer their own experiences. The media of rhetoric are articles, 
books  and  conferences.  The  determining  actors  are  passive,  or  even  non-human  (Latour, 
2005): capitalism to be regulated, financial markets, managers to be liberated in both cases, 
clients…  In  the  latter  two  cases,  the  non-human  characteristic  also  applies  as  it  is  the 
categories of “customer”, “shareholder” or “manager” that are the targets rather than named 
individuals. It is in their name that the change is proposed. In this case, it is of no importance 
that the rhetoric is the same or not, as it is not designed to convince the same public. Even if 
these  non-human  actors  have  no  voice  or physical presence  and  have  no  doubt  made  no 
demands, it is on their behalf that the supporting discourse is constructed. They become the 
spokespeople of others wishing to express their own needs. 
The turbulence and oppression evoked as supporting arguments can be resolved on behalf of 
certain categories of actors. Rhetoric may perhaps permit new subject positions to be created 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009) in which non-humans have an important place. Identical discourses 
can develop in different contexts and periods because the actors in whose name the discourse 
is spoken are different. 
The actors in question are not therefore institutional entrepreneurs because they do not act 
directly. But non-human allies are enrolled and a problematisation of management issues put 
forward by institutional entrepreneurs is  articulated through them. The enrolment of non- 
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human  actors  by  institutional  entrepreneurs  is  sufficient  to  direct  the 
institutionalisation/deinstitutionalisation process one way or another.  
Proposition 2: To understand the similarities between the rhetoric schemes used, the 
enrolment  of  the  non-human  actors  to  whom  the  rhetoric  is  addressed  is  more 
important than those using the rhetoric. 
As regards the mechanisms that institutional entrepreneurs use to create new and modify old 
institutions,  they  use  rhetorical  strategies  or  ‘institutional  vocabularies”  to  discredit  the 
dominant  institutional  logic  which  defined  the  legitimacy  of  organisational  forms  to 
reinterpret  and  manipulate  symbols  and  practices.  Although  at  first  sight  it  may  appear 
paradoxical, the rhetorical devices used to construct legitimacy are often the same as those 
used to deny it. The study by Suddaby & Greenwood (2005) who worked on the Big Five 
accounting firms shows that it is not paradoxical that similar rhetorical devices are used in the 
process to construct or deny legitimacy. They are similar processes that draw on the same 
resources: contradictions embedded in different institutional logics. “In seeking to justify or 
defend such dramatic alterations in institutional arrangements, entrepreneurs must construct 
their innovation or opposition to an innovation in a manner consistent with broader myths, 
narratives, or cultural accounts” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005, 59). The article by Jones & 
Livne-Tarandach  (2008),  discusses  the  way  in  which  architect  firms  use  keywords  as 
rhetorical  strategies  when  competing  for  projects  from  clients;  they  “use  the  same  word 
having multiple  meanings and combine unique keywords from distinct logics to appeal to 
multiple, diverse interests in their audience” (Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008, p. 1075).  
As  regards  budgeting,  we  have  witnessed  a  shift  in  institutional  logics  between  the  two 
periods studied. When budgeting was institutionalised, the aim was to promote an economic 
and social balance within organisations, whereas in the deinstitutionalisation phase new logics 
have  been  introduced  which  are  now  external  to  organisations,  such  as  shareholders, 
customers, etc. The turbulence resulting from market speculation affecting production has 
been replaced by the turbulence of customers affecting shareholders. The pressure of ‘little 
bosses’ on managers has vanished in the face of the dictatorship of the financial markets and 
customers. With similar rhetorical devices addressed to different actors, there are no longer 
any contradictions. The rhetorical devices used to construct legitimacy are the same as those 
used to deny it , since it is the actors to whom they are addressed that have changed. 
Therefore,  contrary  to  what  certain  authors  such  as  Green  (2004)  have  asserted,  rhetoric 
schemes do not create institutional logics but give them coherence and meaning.  
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Proposition 3: similar rhetorical devices used in support of institutionalisation and 
deinstitutionalisation are coherent in that the same resources are used to restore some 
meaning to the contradictions embedded in institutional logics. 
Conclusion 
Our research contributes to a better understanding of how rhetoric is used by actors in the 
institutionalisation/deinstitutionalisation  processes.  Starting  from  an  apparent  paradox  that 
similar rhetorical schemes appear to be used to defend an institutionalised discursive form 
(budgeting), we show that the content of the rhetoric alone does not suffice to understand its 
influence.  It  is  important  to  consider  the  network  of  actors,  not  so  much  the  network  of 
institutional entrepreneurs that disseminate the rhetoric, as that of the non-human actors to 
whom  the  rhetoric  is  addressed.  On  this  basis,  any  contradictions  of  discourse  are  only 
contradictory in appearance since this highly general discourse above all aims to solve the 
problems of contradictions in institutional logics that have changed. 
The  budget,  a  highly  institutionalised  managerial  form,  and  the  BBRT,  the  calling  into 
question  of  this  highly  institutionalised  form,  thus  provides  a  stimulating  framework  for 
understanding the dynamics at work.  
The similarities between the rhetoric used could make one think that there are universal forms 
of rhetoric (Norreklit, 2003) that gurus can use like incantations to bring about change. Our 
observations have brought us to some more moderate conclusions. While the ideas may be the 
same,  they  are  problematised  to  different  actors  in  order  to  solve  the  problems  of 
contradictions between the institutional logics that differ according to the era. 
The institutionalisation process is not simply discursive, as shown by Lounsbury & Crumley 
(2007). It opens up new avenues of research as we now need to analyse rhetoric in their social 
and economic context in order to have a better understanding of the mechanisms at work. 
Furthermore, the contradictions embedded in institutional logics are worthy of analysis in the 
framework of the critical sociology of Boltanski & Chiapello (2005). These contradictions are 
indeed part of a more political perspective and need to be analysed at a different level to that 




APPENDIX: CORPUSES OF REFERENCE TEXTS  
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1930s 
The starting point for budgetary control in France and Europe is certainly the international conference held in 
Geneva from July 10th-12th 1930 on the theme of budgetary control organised by the IIOST. There are two 
sources for consulting the speakers' presentations made to the Geneva conference: 
 
-  IIOST  (1930),  Conférence  internationale  du  contrôle  budgétaire,  Genève,  rapports  de  la  conférence,  2 
volumes available for consultation at the French Bibliothèque Nationale. 
-  Special  issues  summarising  the  conference  was  also  published  in  the  business  journal  Mon  Bureau  in 
August and September 1930, quoting the following: 
Coes (1930), Difficultés et résistances fréquemment rencontrées dans l'instauration de la procédure budgétaire, 
Mon bureau, Septembre, 389-392. 
Jadot (1931), Le contrôle et la gestion des entreprises à l'aide du budget, Mon bureau, May, 291-293 
Landauer E. (1930), Les bases d'un budget des dépenses, Mon bureau, August , 349-350. 
Musil  M.F.  (1930),  Principes  et  méthodes  du  contrôle  budgétaire  -  Ses  aspects  généraux,  Mon  Bureau, 
Septembre, 398-9 
Pulvermann H. (1930), Les organismes centraux de l'administration industrielle et le contrôle budgétaire, Mon 
Bureau, Septembre, p. 400-1 
Schmidt M. (1930), Le budget d'investissement, les affectations de capital et le système budgétaire, Mon bureau, 
August , 351-352. 
Serruys D. (1930), Le système budgétaire et l'organisation économique nationale et internationale, Mon Bureau, 
Sept, 395-397. 
Ludwig H.(1930a), « Le contrôle budgétaire du capital d’exploitation », Mon Bureau, septembre, Paris. 
Ludwig  H.(1930b),  Le  contrôle  budgétaire  dans  les  entreprises  industrielles,  Librairie  française  de 
documentation G. Claisse, Paris,. 
Satet R. (1930), La Conférence Internationale du contrôle budgétaire, IUMM, Genève. 
Penglaou C. (1931), «Le budget considéré comme base de la détermination et du contrôle des crédits accordés 
par les banques», Mon Bureau, Octobre et novembre, p. 621 and 716. 
Saint-Pulgent (de) T. (1934), «Le contrôle budgétaire aux grands magasins du Printemps», Cégos, Document 
OA7, 8 p. 
Penglaou C. (1935), «Le contrôle budgétaire - Son introduction dans les entreprises», L'Organisation, Feb, 65-
68. 
Penglaou C.(1934), « Le budget général », L’Organisation, Décembre, p. 511-515. 
Penglaou  C.(1935),  « Le  contrôle  budgétaire  -  Essai  de  statistique  appliquée  à  la  gestion  des  entreprises », 
Journal de la Société de statistique de Paris, Juillet-Août-Septembre, p. 232-250. 
Satet R. (1936), Le contrôle budgétaire, Dunod, Paris. 
Reitell C. et Lugrin J.P. (1936), «Le contrôle des frais d'exploitation par la méthode des taux standards et du 
budget variable», Bulletin du Comité National Belge de l'Organisation Scientifique, Oct, 265-275. 
Bourquin  M.  (1937),  Méthodes  modernes  de  répartition  et  de  contrôle  des  frais  généraux  dans  l'industrie, 
Dunod, Paris. 
Mareuse M. (1938), Le contrôle de gestion dans les entreprises, Dunod, Paris.  
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Commesnil G.(1935), « Le rôle du comptable dans le problème budgétaire - Méthodes comptables et contrôle 
budgétaire », Congrès National des Comptabilités de Marseille, 20-22 septembre. 
Germain P. (1932b), « Contrôle budgétaire d’une entreprise », L’usine, 29 janvier, p. 33. 
Germain P.( 1932a), « Contrôle budgétaire des entreprise », L’usine, 12 février, p. 6. 
Wiliquet  S.  (1947),  Le  contrôle  budgétaire  dans  une  grande  entreprise  industrielle,  Chambre  Belge  des 
Comptables, Bruxelles. 
 
About the case of the Czech shoe manufacturer Bat'a (or Bata), we quoted: 
Coutrot  J.  (1936),  L'humanisme  économique  -  Les  leçons  de  juin  1936,  Editions  du  centre  polytechnicien 
d'études économiques, Paris. 
Dubreuil H. (1936) L'exemple de Bat'a. La libération des initiatives individuelles dans une entreprise géante. 
Paris, B. Grasset 
Landauer E. (1933), L'oeuvre de Thomas Bat'a, Bulletin du CNOF, june, 177-185. 
Rimailho E. (1936), L'organisation à la française, Paris. 
 
1950s 
We quote the following report produced by the productivity missions: 
OECCA  (1951),  La  comptabilité  au  service  de  la  productivité  aux  Etats-Unis  -  Rapport  préliminaire  de  la 
mission française des experts comptables, AFAP-OECCA, Paris. 
Among all the works of Jean Benoit, we quote:.  
Benoit  J.  (1954),  Contrôle  à  l'usage  de  la  direction,  Xe  International  congress  on  scientific  management 
(Congrès international de l'organisation scientifique), Bulletin du CNOF, May, 22-25. 
Benoit  J  (1956),  La  prévision  de  le  contrôle  budgétaire,  Workshop,  January  20th-21th,  Rennes,  29  p.  (in 
Pechiney archives 001-7-30994 ) 
Benoit J (1958). La gestion des entreprises et son évolution, A lecture given at La Sorbonne University, (in 
Pechiney archives 001-7-30994) 
 
Many others conferences are stored in the Pechiney archives 001-7-30994., the "Jean Benoit Lectures", for 
instance: 
1951. La productivité, expérience dans l'industrie, A lecture given at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense 
Nationale. 
1952. Le contrôle budgétaire français en 6 expériences. CEGOS workshop of May 5
th-7
th 1952. Benoit gave 
three talks, on “Budgetary control in the United States”, “The management indicators used by general managers 
in the US” and “The role of the management controller”1953. Internal memo from Pechiney 
1955. A general manager’s tableau de bord, Speech given by Raoul Vitry, CEO of Pechiney, but written by Jean 
Benoit. 
1958. Reflection on the organisation, A lecture given to the Naval Warfare College (Ecole de guerre navale). 
This lecture was given several years in succession until Benoit’s death in 1962.  
1960.  A  large  firm’s  experience  in  organisation  and  methods.  Army  organisation  committee  (Comité 
d'organisation de l'armée de terre).  
  33 
1961. Lecture to the Regional productivity committee, Lyon 
 
Comité National de la Productivité (1952), Votre meilleur outil, le budget - Le budget par la comptabilité pour la 
productivité, Société auxilliaire  pour la diffusion des éditions de productivité, Paris. 
Charmont C. (1952), Un homme nouveau dans l'entreprise, le contrôleur de gestion, Hommes et Techniques, 
May, 23-26. 
CEGOS (1953), Le contrôle budgétaire, 6 expériences françaises. Paris,Hommes et Techniques 
Loeb P. (1956), Le budget de l'entreprise, Paris, PUF 
Guillaume M. (1958), La gestion budgétaire des entreprises, Anvers, Editions Nauwelaerts  
Parenteau J. (1959), Contrôle de gestion par méthode budgétaire, Paris,Hommes et Techniques 
Satet  R.  (1942),  Le  contrôle  budgétaire  -  Cours  de  l'Ecole  d'Organisation  Scientifique  du  Travail,  Ecole 
d'Organisation Scientifique du Travail, Paris. 
Parenteau, J. (1945) Calcul des prix de revient et comptabilité industrielle, Paris: Cegos 
Parenteau J. (1949), La comptabilité, le contrôle budgétaire et les prix standards, Hommes et Techniques, , 53 
Mai, 27-29. 
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